Toward a Pacific Civilization

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TRANS-PACIFIC AMERICA

“American Studies in Trans-Pacific Perspective,” the theme commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the Japanese Association for American Studies, maps a key moment in U.S. history and in the field of American studies, and it delineates a spatial extension of the American experience from a decidedly Atlantic and European orientation to an equally emphatic Pacific and Asian cast, affirming the fairly recent and liberating turn in American studies from an exceptionalist, interior gaze to a field of vision across national fences. Needless to say, those more expansive horizons accompany the current realities of increasingly porous borders violated routinely by capital, labor, and culture, and, in the case of the U.S., by its new nationalism that aspires toward global dominance and empire even as it strives to shore up its borders against the alleged danger of immigrants.1

America, as well we know, was always a transnational space in which indigenous peoples formed themselves into nations with territories even as they crossed those divides for thousands of years before the arrival of foreigners, aliens from Europe who later claimed nativity calling themselves “Americans” in the continent they occupied through conquest. Despite and perhaps because of that spatial and historical fact, U.S.

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arbiters of the national narrative have repeatedly denied those origins of movements, except during times of particular moment. Thus for example, during the late nineteenth century and at the noonday of U.S. overseas expansion, the nation’s leaders debated the merits of empire and its reciprocal, the in-migration and “flood” of the huddled masses of darker southern and eastern Europe, and empire’s residues, the mixed and mongrel populations of “our new possessions,” the islands of the Caribbean and Pacific. And now, during our age of renewed U.S. aspirations for global supremacy, post-Cold War, those same contentions of empire and its debris have gained currency in the “war against terror” and the self-same “war against immigrants.”

In this paper, “Toward a Pacific Civilization,” I intend to track that Atlantic tradition in American studies, and posit, not in place of but in addition to, a “trans-Pacific perspective” that resists the imposed erasures of the Eurocentric, homogenizing identity for the American species.

**Atlantic Civilization**

To find America, go to its heartland is the usual advice. America’s great interiors—of purple mountains and fertile valleys, of expansive skies and rolling plains, of corn as high as an elephant’s eye and amber waves of grain, of decent folk and honest talk and patriotism topped with a generous helping of cream. That’s the American dream, its heartland.

Surely one of the earliest and most persistent American myths involves its origin story of how Americans became Americans. Europeans, the raced, gendered, and sexualized tale begins, crossed an ocean, staggered to shore, and sowed their seed. That implantation, that encounter between Europeans and America’s wilderness (a tangle of plants, animals, natives) was the process of Americanization, the means by which the English, Scottish, Dutch, French became Americans.

Along the frontier, the divide between civilization and barbarism, light and darkness, “the wilderness masters the colonist,” in the words of historian Frederick Jackson Turner, giving him his coarseness and strength, acuteness and inventiveness, individualism and love of freedom. Those were among the core American virtues that were distilled within the crucible of the frontier. ²

That founding myth we know from Henry Nash Smith’s classic study, *Virgin Land*, was part of an agrarian tradition that turned inward and found America’s soul in the land, the unturned sod, the exceptional envi-
ronment and encounter. According to this tradition, the ocean formed a protective moat, a barrier that allowed the American variety to develop and grow, shielded from foreign frosts and blights. American nationalism, Smith points out, was expressed in countless “rhapsodies on the West,” and the agrarian tradition “made it difficult for Americans to think of themselves as members of a world community because it affirmed that the destiny of this country leads her away from Europe toward the agricultural interior of the continent.”

But there is a countervailing narrative, Smith informs us, of a maritime tradition that extends outward and connects America to its European forebears and its original stock. Although apparently at odds one with the other as posed by Smith, the maritime tradition is, in my view, a complementary account of America’s agrarian origins in that its people—as a raced collective—and their institutions and culture are derivatives of European antecedents. Whether arising from agrarian or maritime pasts, the American species is essentially European, according to those accounts of American history.

A version of that Eurocentrism holds that America was the western terminus of an Atlantic civilization that embraced European “cultural hearths” and their diasporas. Columbus’ first landing in 1492 constitutes the beginning of this Atlantic civilization as conceived. His “discovery,” although unclear to him to his death (Columbus believed he had found Asia and its outlying islands), fixed America onto European maps that located islands and the eastern shores of what became two continents by grids of longitude and latitude. Eventually, with the global spread of Europeans, those coordinates would delineate and encompass the entire world.

Europe is the genesis, the birth mother, the natal source in that rendition. American peoples and their institutions and cultures were tributaries that flowed and drew from European headwaters. Herbert Baxter Adams, a mentor of Frederick Jackson Turner at Johns Hopkins University, was an influential advocate of the “germ theory” that held that all American institutions derived from medieval Germany and spread with European migrants to the New World. Indeed, Turner’s frontier hypothesis that reversed the origin and direction of American institutions arose, he confessed, as a reaction to Adams’ germ theory “due to my indignation.”

Turner’s equally Eurocentric variant, however, simply stressed the American side of Atlantic civilization, and the connection charted by
Columbus between America and Europe remained the central feature of a more global view of U.S. history. As noted by the immigration historian Marcus Lee Hansen, “the migration to America was one aspect of the growth and spread of the population of Atlantic Europe,” wherein “Atlantic Europe” was conceived of the European peoples who bordered the north Atlantic. Hansen, although framing the Atlantic migration from America’s shore (that is, from a U.S.-centric point of view), describes that movement of peoples as a reciprocal and complementary process that was mediated by trans-Atlantic commercial networks. There was, he writes, “despair in Europe” and “hope in America.” Those corresponding attitudes propelled the Atlantic migration, and in Ireland and Germany, prosperity replaced grinding poverty, and in the U.S., pessimism succumbed to boundless confidence and expectation.6

That perceived correspondence between Europe and the U.S. was longstanding. Thomas Jefferson called it the “American system” because America’s founding inspired the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century revolutions in states bordering the north Atlantic, creating a republican kinship that contrasted with the despotisms of central and eastern Europe. And in 1906, Henry Adams more generously proposed the “Atlantic system,” which was a “community of interest” among the nations of the north Atlantic basin. Forrest Davis, writing on the eve of America’s entry into World War II, argued that the Atlantic system was “old, rational, and pragmatic,” that its roots ran “deep and strong into the American tradition,” and that it had emerged from “strategic and political realities.”7 The Atlantic Charter, signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941, exemplified that common interest in defending the ties of blood and tradition.

The ocean and its shores, to some advocates of the Atlantic world, hold much virtue as a unit of analysis. Devoid of national boundaries, the ocean-unit foregrounds transnationalisms that fracture the binary of the “old” and “new” world, the distinction between metropole and colony, and insular nationalisms like American exceptionalism. The Atlantic world, they maintain, was a system of “cultural hearths” in Europe, Africa, and the Americas that spread and interacted in complex ways, and that therefore requires comparative and cross-cultural studies.8 Despite that postmodernist gesture toward multiculturalism, this version of the Atlantic world still centers Europe and the expansion of its peoples and their deeds upon indigenous Africa and the Americas. Herein, whites act upon non-whites.9

Paul Gilroy takes on that Eurocentrism in his The Black Atlantic. In
truth, Gilroy tells us, the book arose from his experience trying to persuade students that history and the life of the mind held significance for their circumscribed interests and pursuits. “The Black Atlantic developed from my uneven attempts to show these students that the experiences of black people were part of the abstract modernity they found so puzzling and to produce as evidence some of the things that black intellectuals had said—sometimes as defenders of the West, sometimes as its sharpest critics—about their sense of embeddedness in the modern world.”

In his influential intervention, Gilroy describes a black Atlantic that was not specifically African, American, Caribbean, or British, but one that was all of those simultaneously transcendent of nation, race, and ethnicity and emphatically and mutably mixed and hybrid.

Although unacknowledged, Gilroy’s unit of study is the old Atlantic world and its pedigree of the American system, Atlantic civilization, and Eurocentrism. Africans within that universe become “embedded” within European modernity, and racialization is more complicated by hybridity but its constituent parts remain in essence black and white. Slighted are Native Americans who preceded and were overwritten by Atlantic civilization and Asians who, like Africans, were transported to the Americas and became thereby “embedded” in the “black Atlantic.”

What I would like to propose in this brief study is that America is surely a part of the north Atlantic world and the south black Atlantic, but it is also a “cultural hearth” of a Pacific civilization that, like its Atlantic counterpart, is a system of flows of capital, labor, and culture that produces transnational and hybrid identities as well as its counterclaims for homogeneity, nationalism, and racial purity. In that sense, I suggest that the U.S. is an island surrounded by lands north and south, but also oceans, east and west. And as an island, unlike the imagined insularity of the agrarian tradition and frontier hypothesis, the U.S. must be viewed properly as a center with its own integrity but also as a periphery and a fluid space of movements and engagements that resist closure and inevitable or final outcomes.

**PACIFIC CIVILIZATION**

Indeed, as figured in Atlantic civilization, America’s very “discovery” resulted from a transnational project—Europe’s ancient and persistent search for a passage to Asia. As noted by Christopher Columbus in his ship’s daily log, his expedition’s purpose was to go “to the regions of
India, to see the Princes there and the peoples and the lands, and to learn of their disposition, and of everything, and the measures which could be taken for their conversion to our Holy Faith.”

In 1513, Spain’s Vasco Nuñez de Balboa traversed Panama’s isthmus, waded into the Gulf of San Miguel after waiting for hours for the tide to come in for a photogenic moment, gazed across the Mar del Sur (the South Sea) toward Asia, and issued the absurdly grandiose claim of “real and corporeal and actual possession of these seas and lands and coasts and ports and islands of the south, and all their annexures and kingdoms and provinces to them pertaining . . . in the name of the Kings of Castile present or to come . . . both now and in all times, as long as the world endures until the final day of judgement [sic] of mortal man.”

A consequence of American and European mappings of the Pacific was the outflow of Asia’s peoples, mainly laborers, to America. The peripheries were thereby drawn toward the core along the Pacific’s rim. Apt is the metaphor of a ship, as pointed out by Paul Gilroy, “a living, micro-cultural, micro-political system in motion. . . .” Ships, Gilroy explained, shift attention from the shore to the middle passage and the circulation of people, ideas, and culture.

Images come to mind of Filipino and Chinese seamen on board Spanish galleons beginning in 1565, and Hawaiian sailors who, during the 1830s, comprised the majority of the crews on American ships that carried animal furs from America’s Pacific Northwest to Canton, China. Those were the forerunners of Asian migrants today who are called “trapeze artists” in Chinese because they hang suspended over the Pacific between the U.S. and Asia. With the focus on the crossing, their frequency and multiple directions, the parents are called “astronauts” and their children, “parachute kids” who land in America to attend school. And cultures, like peoples, dart across the Pacific’s expanses and defy easy capture and labels. Can the Hong Kong, Jackie Chan movies so popular in America be classed as Asian cinema, and is Taiwan-born director Ang Lee’s filming of Jane Austen’s Sense and Sensibility (1995) a translation? When Japanese capital in the form of Sony and Nissan locate their plants in the U.S. their products bear the label “Made in America,” and Sony’s Akio Morita told Newsweek’s readers, when his company bought Columbia Pictures in 1989, “We are still expanding our facilities in this country [the U.S.]. I don’t like the word ‘multinational.’ I don’t know what it means. I created a new term: ‘global localization.’ That’s our new slogan.”
Those new natives, like the old imperialists and expatriates, assume the names of the indigenous peoples, allowing them to make claims upon the land as if it were their own. Thus Europeans become *native* Americans and Asian capital make *American* products. The Native Sons (and Daughters) of the Golden West—white American and European immigrants to California following the gold rush—designated themselves as natives, and then sought to expel aliens and foreigners—Chinese who were like them migrants, but also Mexicans and Californios who had preceded them in Mexico’s far north and who, in turn, had staked claims in disregard of the original caretakers of the land, America’s Indians.

And seen from Asia’s shore, Asian migration to America constituted an Asian diaspora from the Asian core to American peripheries, from Asian cultural hearths to American cultural hearths. Indeed, this paper’s archaeology, from my reading of Andre Gunder Frank, is Eurocentric and ahistorical. In his remapping of the world economy, Frank proposes that Asia, including China, India, Persia, and Turkey, were the major centers of a global system that long predated Europe’s rise. “Europe,” Frank notes, “climbed up on the back of Asia, then stood on Asian shoulders—temporarily.” Its search for Asia was as a supplicant, not a master, and Europe was dependent upon silver drawn mainly from Mexico and Peru to initiate trade with Asia, cover its perennial deficits, and rectify its Asian trade imbalance. Europeans served as brokers between Asia and America, Africa, and Europe in an expanded world-system that centered on China and India. In the eighteenth century, Frank reminds us, the well-known Atlantic trade triangle was in fact an adjunct of the Afro-Eurasian trade in which Europeans exchanged Indian textiles and European manufactures for African slaves who produced America’s sugar, tobacco, and other goods exported to Europe. Economic decline, political instability, and European conquest and colonialism in Asia and the silver and gold mined in America by enslaved Indians and Africans in America led to Europe’s preeminence that lasted for less than two centuries, a brief interlude in Asia’s dominance from 1500 to 1800 and again in our time.

Frank poses in this study a provocative challenge to Eurocentrism in the works of Fernand Braudel and Immanuel Wallerstein, but Asiacentrism, like Eurocentrism, disallows other centers and slights the margins that pose resistances to the more glaring hegemonies. Similarly, in my present bid for a Pacific civilization and its absorption with the
crossing, I can easily lose sight of those who have made the ocean their home, the place of their nativity.

The Pacific is not a negative space between continents or the hole in a doughnut, the breakfast food of champions and a tasty trope for the Pacific’s rim. Niuean poet John Pahiatua Pule reflected upon that absence and Henry Kissinger’s comment when asked about U.S. nuclear tests on the Marshall Islands, “There are only 90,000 people out there, who gives a damn?”

I look at the map of the Pacific.
The American navy calls the Pacific the American Lake.
They have ships in Samoa
Hawaii, Taiwan, Philippines,
Belau, Kwajalein, Truk
the Mariannas, the Carolines.
In Micronesia there are only 90,000 people,
who gives a damn?
The dead are louder in protest than the living.
The living are silent.
Everything is silent.18

Samoan novelist and university professor Albert Wendt rejected the “fatal impact theory” of colonial literature that pronounced the death of native cultures with the arrival of the Europeans. “We and our cultures have survived and adapted when we were expected to die, vanish, under the influence of supposedly stronger superior cultures and their technologies,” he wrote. “Our story of the Pacific is that of marvelous endurance, survival and dynamic adaptation, despite enormous suffering under colonialism in some of our countries. We have survived through our own efforts and ingenuity. We have indigenised much that was colonial or foreign to suit ourselves, creating new blends and forms.”19

Instead of conceiving the Pacific as “the last and greatest unknown quantity” from the drawing tables of European map makers,20 we might conceive of Pacific civilization as “Oceania” as appropriated and reconceived by the Tongan writer Epeli Hau‘ofa who distinguishes between “Pacific islands” and “Oceania.”21 The former, he observes, denotes tiny bits of land and reefs surrounded by a vast and empty ocean, whereas the latter conjures a “sea of islands” and their inhabitants. “Their was a large world in which peoples and cultures moved and mingled, unhindered by boundaries of the kind erected much later by imperial powers,”
wrote Hau‘ofa of Oceania’s peoples. “From one island to another they sailed to trade and to marry, thereby expanding social networks for greater flows of wealth. They traveled to visit relatives in a wide variety of natural and cultural surroundings, to quench their thirst for adventure, and even to fight and dominate.” The sea, before Europeans, had no exclusionary laws, fences, or border patrols or imaginary cartographic lines, “but rather points of entry that were constantly negotiated and even contested. The sea was open to anyone who could navigate a way through.” It was imperialism that erected boundaries, created island states and territories, and confined people to restricted spaces isolated from each other.22

The efficacy of an Oceania identity, Hau‘ofa tells his readers, rests in its ability to steer clear of the “reef of our diversity” and the imposed alienations of nation states and to promote a consciousness “that would help free us from the prevailing, externally generated definitions of our past, present, and future.”23 That capacious apprehension, Hau‘ofa cautions, is not in place of but in addition to Oceania’s diverse ethnicities that counter the homogenizing forces of global culture. A regional identity offers a powerful antidote to the caricatures of noble savage, lost and debased souls, and helpless pawns in the conflicts between civil and savage, Christianity and barbarism, and West and East. With the advent of the Pacific century, Hauo‘fa points out, “our erstwhile suitors are now creating with others along the rim of our ocean a new set of relationships that excludes us totally.”24 That exclusion has relevance to Oceania’s very survival, including nuclear tests that poison both land and sea, depletions of fisheries and the ocean’s resources, and mutilations of cultural identities.

The assertion of Oceania, thus, is in resistance to the blank space created by Euro- and Asia-centrism and evokes the freedoms of the boundless, restless sea. “Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, Oceania is humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper still, Oceania is us,” Hau‘ofa exhorts. “We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this ancient truth and together use it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again, physically and psychologically, in the tiny spaces that we have resisted accepting as our sole appointed places, and from which we have recently liberated ourselves. We must not allow anyone to belittle us again, and take away our freedom.”25
In truth, whether conceiving of Pacific civilization as an overarching hegemony of Europe and the U.S. or Asia or as a resistance to colonialism through an Oceania identity, there is no Pacific region as an “objective” given, as pointed out by historian and cultural critic Arif Dirlik, only “a competing set of ideational constructs that project upon a certain location on the globe the imperatives of interest, power, or vision of these historically produced relationships.” And as such, those discourses are not simply plural but are oppositional in relations of power, one seeking dominion and the other resisting that imposition. Within the idea of the Pacific, hegemony is commonly rendered as global while resistance, local. There is much virtue to the construct, especially because it positions Oceania’s peoples against the activities over, through, and upon the Pacific by peoples along the rim—Europeans, Americans, and Asians. But there are multiple meanings to “local,” as when Hawaiian activists distinguish between “indigenous” and “local” and therewith rights and privileges, or when multinationals like Sony assimilate and assume the name and form of natives through “global localization.” Dirlik thus urges a “critical localism” that simultaneously rejects essentialist notions of indigenous cultures and the glossings of globalism.

Pacific civilization is both global and local, a crossing and a home. It is multiply positioned and occupied. Sighted from the U.S. shore, the Pacific marks the continent’s edge and the ocean’s uncharted expanses. It is the vast unknown. It is the other ocean. The Atlantic is the self—familiar and raced European, whereas the Pacific is the other—alien and raced Asian. And yet Asia has weighed on the minds of Europeans as part of their patrimony and destiny, as an opportunity and “open door.” But Asia also poses a threat to white supremacy. The Atlantic alliance confronts the Pacific menace. In the nineteenth-century European imaginary, the “yellow peril” threatened to swamp European civilization and Christianity, and in the late twentieth century it strived to usurp capitalism and Western civilization and complete the unfinished business that allegedly began with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor.

Atlantic civilization, whether white or black, creates binaries that have been integral to the U.S. social and racial formations. The white Atlantic features a Eurocentrism that positions the U.S. as a correlate of European civilization, while the African diaspora (or the black Atlantic) mitigates Eurocentrism but also reinscribes the racial dualism of black and white.
This article proposes a Pacific civilization not to displace Atlantic civilization, but to intervene in the binaries of Eurocentrism and race. America has, since its “discovery,” found its manifest destiny in westering, in its thrust toward Asia, and Asians have, like their African diasporic counterparts, been captured and recruited for the plantations of the “new world.” The U.S. is equally an Atlantic as well as a Pacific civilization. That recognition allows for multiplicities within the U.S. social and racial formations that contradict the Republic’s foundational binaries. (It also releases Africa from the Atlantic to an embrace of its Indian Ocean civilization and ties with Asia.)

Yet that notion of a Pacific civilization, if centered around the “self” of the U.S., establishes another binary of the U.S. and “others” that reduces as local social relations, which are global while privileging the “self” (the U.S.). It might also inspire a white and yellow racial binary (white North America and yellow East Asia) and a rim-centered American and Asian binary that slights the transnational ocean and the peoples of Oceania (and Asians other than East Asians). And why add Pacific civilization to Atlantic civilization when the very idea of “civilization” is bloated with Eurocentric, developmental, and hegemonic meanings? The “burden” (and challenge), thus, of constructing a Pacific civilization is simultaneously to disrupt the hegemonies of Atlantic civilization and describe alternatives that avoid replicating old or conjuring new hierarchies.

NOTES

A version of this paper was published in Yiorgos Kalogerias, Eleftheria Arapoglou, and Linda Manney (eds.), Transcultural Localisms: Responding to Ethnicity in a Globalized World (Heidelberg, Germany: Universitatsverlag Winter, 2006), 15–25.
4 Ibid., 6–8, 12.
5 Turner, Frontier, 38.


17 For example, Fernand Braudel’s three volume, *Civilization and Capitalism, 15th–18th Century*, and Immanuel Wallerstein’s three volume, *The Modern World System*.


24 Ibid., 119. For an exposition on Pacific rim discourse as an American construct during late capitalism and the late cold war years, see Christopher L. Connery, “Pacific Rim Discourse: The U.S. Global Imaginary in the Late Cold War Years,” in *Asia/Pacific as Space of Cultural Production*, edited by Rob Wilson and Arif Dirlik (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1995), 30–56.